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ANTITRUST STANDARDS OF ILLEGALITY FOR TYING
ARRANGEMENTS
For a number of years the shoe industry has been undergoing
significant economic changes at the manufacturing and retail levels.
Although there are approximately i,ooo shoe manufacturers, the
four largest make 23 per cent of the nation's shoes. These large man-
ufacturers are no longer merely selling shoes to independent shoe deal-
ers, but they are also acquiring existing retail outlets to assure them-
selves of available markets.'
This acquisition of retail outlets is known as "vertical integra-
tion" and is being accomplished by merger, acquisition, or contractual
arrangements such as tie-ins.2 A contractual tying arrangement exists
when the procurement 3 of a desired product, called the tying product,
is conditioned upon the purchase of another, the tied product, in
which the seller has a financial interest.
4
An undesirable consequence of any vertical integration is that the
smaller manufacturers find it difficult to locate truly independent
dealers who will sell their product, since they are already committed
by ownership or contract to one of the large manufacturers.5 The
'Brown Shoe Company v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 30002, 328-34 (1962);
Brown Shoe Co., Docket No. 7606, CCH 1961-1963 Transfer Binder Trade Reg.
Rep. 16, 316 (FTC 1963) (Final order).
2It seems clear that tie-ins are contractual vertical arrangements. Kessler &
Sterm, possibly through oversight, do not include them in their list of various
vertical contractual integrations. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 Yale LJ. 1 (1959). However, McLaren includes both ex-
clusive dealing arrangements (defined infra at note 48) and tie-ins under the heading
of "requirements arrangements." McLaren, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 141, 143, 144 (1950).
3 Often the tying product is leased. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936). It is apparently not necessary that a remunerative price be paid for the
tying product. International Salt Co. v. United States, supra; cf. FTC v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18,
23 (N.D. Cal. 1949). Nor is it a defense that nothing was paid for the tying pro-
duct, but nonpayment will probably insulate the defendant from per se condemna-
tion. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 50, 65 (1958). It may even be a key characteristic of a tie-in that the
price charged for the tying product, if any is charged at all, is lower than would
ordinarily be charged without the tie-in. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 21 (1957).
4FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
388 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376
(7 th Cir. 1941).
5Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note i (merger); United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (contractual tie-in); United States v. DuPont & Co.,
357 U.S. 586 (1957) (acquisition); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
CASE COMMENTS
Supreme Court recognized the evils of a shoe industry vertical merger
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States the "Merger Case," which con-
demned the merger of the third largest shoe manufacturer with the
largest family-style shoe chain.
In the recent case of Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC,7 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the legality of a vertical integra-
tion based on contractual tying arrangements.8 During the past
thirty years, Brown has offered a "franchise plan" to retail shoe deal-
ers throughout the nation. Under the "plan," dealers receive many
"valuable" services 9 without charge 0 enabling them to reduce over-
head costs and to modernize selling techniques. The enrolled dealers
have shown between 4 and 5 per cent higher profit on their shoe sales
than the national retail shoe store average.
In return, the dealer agrees to "concentrate my business within
the grades and price lines of shoes representing Brown Shoe ... and
will have no lines conflicting with Brown...."" Brown limits dealer
purchases from other manufacturers to 25 per cent of the dealer's total
requirements, most of which must be from lines not competing with
Brown 12 If the dealer exceeds this percentage, he loses the "plan," al-
though he may still buy shoes from Brown.'3 The attrition from the
"plan" has been low.14
258 U.S. 316 (1922) (contractual exclusive dealing arrangement). Tie-ins are also
objectional because they force an unwanted product, the tied one, on the purchaser
thereby eliminating his freedom of choice as to that tied product. United States v.
Loew's, Inc., supra.
'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note i.
'339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964).
6The court also found the evidence insufficient to show illegal resale price
maintenance. Id. at 56.
"These include: architectural plans, a field representative service, merchandis-
ing records and advice, retail sales training programs, an accounting system, na-
tional and retail meetings, group purchase of insurance and rubber footwear,
discounts on certain lines, and loans; extensions of credit are offered by one of
Brown's subsidiaries. Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra note 7, at 46, 47; Brown Shoe
Co., supra note i, at 21,146; Brown Shoe Co., Docket No. 7606, CCH 1961-1963
Transfer Binder Trade Reg. Rep. 15,705 (FTC Feb. 1962) (initial order) 20,534.
1'Window display props are available at a price from $5oo to $6oo per year.
It is not clear if the enrolled dealer is required to purchase them. Brown Shoe Co.
v. F.T.C., supra note 7, at 53.
"Id. at 49.
"Id. at 5o.
"rhe constant availability of the tied product would not seem to constitute
a defense by itself, since even in arrangements that have been condemned, the
tied product was always available. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958) (freight services); International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 3
(salt); United States v. American Can Co., supra note 3 (cans).
" tThirty-one dealers have been expelled from the plan during a twenty-year
period. Brown Shoe Co., supra note 9 (initial order), at 20,534.
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Less than one per cent of the total national shoe sales are con-
trolled by the 766 "franchise" dealers of Brown, but this percentage
is higher in some 6oo small and medium-sized towns.15 The annual
dollar sales to the enrolled dealers exceeds $24,oooooo,16 Brown does
not have a monopoly in the tying product, franchise services, or in
the tied product, shoes. Several other large shoe manufacturers have
similar "plans.'
7
The Federal Trade Commission attacked Brown's franchise plan'8
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act19 concerning
unfair methods of competition. The Commission held that the Merger
Case, decided under section 7 of the Clayton Act,20 required the Com-
24Brown contended that the nation as a whole should be considered the
relevant geographic market, but the Commission declared the relevant geographic
market to be each of the 6oo small and medium-sized towns. Brown Shoe Co.,
supra note 9 (initial order), at 20,534-35. The Commission and the Eighth Circuit
clearly implied it did not make any difference.
"For the fiscal year ending October 31, 1959, the dollar sales were $24,675,617
which far exceeded the total sales of the tenth-ranked shoe manufacturer. Brown
Shoe Co., supra note i, at 21,245.
''rhe Commission mentioned International Shoe Company and General Shoe
Company. Id. at 21,245. These plans do not go as far as the Brown plan, but like
the Brown plan, they also have a noncompliance penalty. It is not clear if these are
the only three plans available to shoe dealers, but if they are, it is significant to note
that the manufacturers offering them are among the top four shoe producers. The
individual adoption of restrictive arrangements by several major producers in an
industry, though not collusive, may have the collective effect of excluding small
producers as a whole. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949);
Kessler 9= Stern, supra note 2, at 30-37.
"'The Hearing Examiner found the arrangement to be an exclusive dealing
arrangement (defined infra note 48), but the Commission abandoned that theory
in favor of a tie-in theory. Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra note 7, at 5o.
""Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (1958).
This was probably the only method available to attack this particular arrange-
ment. Under the Sherman Act, the requirements and standards of proof would
be too difficult to meet. See notes 37-46 and accompanying text. Under the Clayton
Act, services are probably not "commodities." United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 558-59 (E.D. Pa. 196o), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 13, at 13; Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 6o9 n.27 (1953); Fleetway, Inc. v. Public
Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626
(1935); 58 Colum. L. Rev. 887-88 (1959). Also, a gratuitous offering is not a "sale"
or a "lease" under the Clayton Act. See United States v. Investors Diversified Serv.,
Inc., 1o2 F. Supp. 645 (D. .Minn. ig5i), in which a loan was held not to be a "sale" or
a "lease" under the Clayton Act.
2"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corpor-
ation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
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mission to examine thoroughly shoe industry conditions to discover
whether Brown's tying arrangements had an anti-competitive effect.
2 '
The Commission analyzed the shoe industry and found that Brown's
arrangement, if enforced, would have an adverse effect on compe-
tition. Failing to find a distinction between the effect of a vertical
merger and the effect of a tying arrangement, the Commission stated
that contral over the dealer was still control, and the fact that this
control could end tomorrow, as in a mere contractual arrangement,
is not important.22
The Commission then found that the tying arrangement was en-
forced 23 and precluded competitiors of Brown from selling to dealers
enrolled under the Brown "franchise" plan. A cease and desist order
was issued stating that the "standards of illegality" 24 under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act had been met. The order
further stated that in view of the Merger Case, the standards of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act25 had also been met. In effect, this meant the
"standards of illegality" in cases arising under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act were applicable to proceedings under section 3 of that statute,
and that those section 7 standards had been met in this case. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously reversed the
Commission order on two grounds:26 (i) lack of economic power in
the tying product,27 and (2) vertical contractual arrangements are
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly ...... 38 Stat. 73, (914), as amended 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950)-
"Brown Shoe Co., supra note i, at 21,145.
-Id. at 21,142. The Commission stressed the longevity and stability of the pro-
gram and the low attrition rate.
nApparently, Brown even conceded this before the Commission. Brown Shoe
Co., supra note i, at 21, 137-38. This finding was not disturbed by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
2 See the definition, infra note 34.
2"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatent-
ed, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 73i
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
3See note 47 and accompanying text.
"Although a Sherman Act violation was not alleged, it was necessary to dis-
cuss whether there was economic power in the tying products because, if proven,
211
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to be distinguished from vertical mergers.2s The court found the
Merger Case "utterly unpersuasive here."
29
By distinguishing the Merger Case, the court, in effect, held that
the standards of illegality as applied by the courts in cases arising un-
der section 7 of the Clayton Act have no place in a Commission pro-
ceeding against tying arrangements brought under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The court apparently reasoned,
therefore, that a thorough examination of the shoe industry was im-
proper. Instead, the percentage of the relevant geographic market
foreclosed to other competitors of Brown would be controlling and
this percentage was too low to condemn the Brown "plan."
The court did not discuss whether the Commission's approach of
thorough market examination could be justified on grounds other than
the Merger Case and section 7 of the Clayton Act. The court conclud-
ed by comparing the instant case to Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
FTC,30 wherein the court stated:
such power, by itself, can meet a requirement of illegality under § 3 of the Clayton
Act. See note 47 and accompanying text. The court distinguished the following
cases dealing with economic power in the tying product; United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
supra note 5; United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note i9; Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 13.
This first ground was not strongly urged by the Commission when it condemned
the arrangement.
2The court held that since arrangements under § 3 of the Clayton Act are
based only on contract, the manufacturer has less control over the dealer who can
leave the arrangement anytime; whereas a vertical merger or acquisition vests
dealer control absolutely in the manufacturer. See Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra
note 7, at 55. Other authorities have alluded to this obvious distinction: United
States v. Brown Shoe Co., supra note i, at 33a n.55; Coyle, Brown Shoe: Judicial
Reaffirmance of Traditional Clayton Act Standards, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 174, 184; Kes-
sler & Stern, supra note 2, at 78. Compare with note 22 and accompanying text.
The Federal Trade Commission has drawn a more theoretical distinction between
§ 3 and § 7. Section 3 is designed to protect sellers in their immediate right to
reach a market, whereas § 7 is concerned with the long range effect of competi-
tion generally. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 5o F.T.C. 555 (1953); 14 Baylor L. Rev. 453,
458 (1962).
=Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra note 7, at 55. It is interesting to note that in
the Merger Case the Court considered all franchised stores as " 'Brown stores' in
defining the relevant geographic market for the horizontal merger: "Brown was
able to exercise sufficient control over these stores and departments to warrant
their characterization as 'Brown' outlets for the purpose of measuring the share and
effect of Brown's competition at the retail level." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
supra note i, at 337 n.66.
1299 F.2d 839, 42 (6th Cir. 1962), quoting from McElhenny Co. v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 167 F. Supp. 949, 954, aff'd 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
The court relied heavily on United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
In this Timken case, a roller bearing manufacturer cancelled orders of distribu-
tors when the distributors handled competing lines of the manufacturer. This was
held not to be an illegal exclusive dealing arrangement absent proof that the dis-
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"'The anti-trust laws do not prohibit a manufacturer or dis-
tributor from selecting dealers who will devote their time and
energies to selling the former's product and a manufacturer is
not compelled to retain dealers having divided loyalties .......
Unlike other antitrust violations, which are condemned under only
one or two federal statutes, tying arrangements are condemned under
three: section i of the Sherman Act,
31 section 3 of the Clayton Act,32
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.33 Under these
three statutes the standards of proof, generally referred to as the
"standards of illegality," 34 have not been entirely clarified by the
courts.
35
Section i of the Sherman Act. Of the three statutes condemning
tying arrangements, section i of the Sherman Act carries the most
stringent requirements and standards of illegality. For the proponent3
to prevail, he must establish three requirements:
i. Economic power in the tying product.
2. A substantial amount of commerce in the tied product.
tributors entered into an "agreement" or "understanding" with the manufacturer
to handle exclusively the manufacturer's bearings. In its opinion, the Commission
distinguished the Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, supra, decision by pointing
tween the manufacturer and shoe dealer. Brown Shoe Co., supra note i, at 21,141.
out that, unlike that case, there was an "agreement" and "understanding" here be-
m"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be Ilegal. 26 Stat. 209 (189o), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
"See note 25.
mSee note 19.
31A definition of terms is necessary. "Requirements of illegality" are conditions
which must be proven in order to find violation. All courts agree as to what these
requirements are under the various statutes. The "standards of illegality" or proof
concerns the test, method, or approach employed to meet a given requirement.
This is the area of confusion.
There is an occasional overlap between requirements and standards, particu-
larly when dealing with § i of the Sherman Act.
anSome cases involving tie-ins have avoided reference to the standards of
illegality by justifying the manufacturer's arrangement on the ground of "product
integrity." This emerging defense was early enunciated by the Supreme Court. See
International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 3; International Business Machs.
Corp. v. United States, supra note 3; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299
U.S. 3 (1936); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 258 U.S. 451 (1922). Recent
cases involving this defense are: United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra
note ig; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 5o5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S.
885 (1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (ist Cir.
ig6). For a general discussion of all these cases, see 63 Mich. L. Rev. 550 (1965);
62 Mich. L. Rev. 1413 (1964).
' The Justice Department can proceed on a criminal basis or bring an injunc-
tion suit in a federal district court. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4 (1958)-
Private litigants may also sue. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Son, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (195).
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3. A "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce affected
by the transaction.
37
When these requirements are met, it will have been established that
the defendant has sufficient economic power in the tying product to
force substantial sales of his tied product.
3s
The first requirement has been the source of much confusion. At
one time, economic power in the tying product could be established
only upon a showing of absolute monopoly39 which, in turn, was
automatically done whenever the tying product was patented4O or
copyrighted. 41 This was "per se" illegality.42 The economic power
standard was later diluted to require only "sufficient economic power
to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied
product." 4
3
This weakening of the economic power standard led some authori-
ties to assert that the first requirement could be inferred from the
presence of the second requirement. In other words, economic power
over the tying product must be present if an "appreciable" number
37Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note ig. A company
owning two of the three daily newspapers in New Orleans, a morning and an eve-
ning paper, did not violate the Sherman Act when it required advertisers buying
space in one of its papers to purchase also space in the other.
"sIbid.
8Ibid.
',International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 3; Mercoid Corp v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495
(1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 3og U.S. 436 (1940); Leitch Mfg. Co.
v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (193); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 5o2 (1917). Most of these cases involve patent infringement suits brought
by the patent owner. For a general discussion of these cases, see 4 Toulmin, Anti-
Trust Laws § 18 (195o).
'1United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 5; United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
"2"A 'per se' rule is one whereby evidence of a few selective facts conclusively
settles a different, ultimate issue of fact and/or law." Comment, 65 Yale L.J. 34,
46 n.68 (1955). The best example is an agreement to fix prices under the Sherman
Act. Once price fixing is established, a Sherman Act violation exists. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150 (1940). As to the per se rule in tying
arrangements, see generally Turner, supra note 3; 63 Mich. L. Rev. 550 (1965).
This comment will not deal further with the per se rules, except to point out that
the "quantitative" test (see note 53 and accompanying text) might be considered a
per se approach.
3Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 13, at ii. A tying arrangement
was condemned under the Sherman Act when a railroad conditioned the sale
of land near railroad tracks upon the buyer shipping his goods over the de-
fendant seller's railroad.
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of buyers are willing to enter into the tying arrangement.4 4 Apparent-
ly, the Supreme Court recognized this reasoning, for in its latest sec-
tion i tie-in case, 45 the Court, in dictum, said: "Even absent a show-
ing of market dominance [in the tying product], the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying products desirability to con-
sumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."
46
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The requirements for illegality under
section 3 of the Clayton Act are identical to those of section i of the
Sherman Act, except that under section 3 it is only necessary that the
proponent established either economic power in the tying product
or a substantial restraint on commerce in the tied product.
4 7 Most
of the confusion in section 3 tie-in cases4 s results from an attempt to
"Id. at 7, 8 (dictum); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of The Clayton
Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913, 945 (1952); Turner, supra note 3, at 65; 63 Mich. L. Rev.
55o-51 n.7 (1965).
,United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 5. The Sherman Act forbids con-
ditioning the sale or license of one copyrighted feature film upon the sale or
license of several inferior films. Such a practice is called "block-booking" and
had been condemned earlier. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note
41, at 156-58. For a discussion of the reasons a seller or licensor of films adopts
such a practice, see Stigler, A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. Ct. Rev. 152.
"United States v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 5, at 45. With regard to the Court's
reference to "uniqueness," see the recent case of Susser v. Carvel Corp., supra note
35. In that case, a tying item consisting of a trade-mark was not sufficiently unique
to meet, per se, the tying product test. There was a dissent, however, and it is sig-
nificant to note that the court also found an inconsequential volume of business in
the tied product. Futhermore, the arrangement was justified anyway on the basis
of "product integrity." The case is discussed in 63 Mich L. Rev. 550 (1965). The
court in that case did not state how it is possible for a trade-mark to be a tying
product.
At least one federal case has impliedly followed that part of the dictum deal-
ing with consumer "desirability." In Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9 th
Cir. 1964), it was held that the Sherman Act forbids an oil company conditioning
renewal of leases to dealers upon the dealers purchasing all their oil, gasoline, bat-
teries, tires, and other accessories from the oil company. Although relying prin-
cipally on Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 17, which is factually
similar, the court expressly favored the dictum in United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
supra.
"Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 19, at 6o8-o9;
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note note 46. It is a general maxim that the
Sherman Act has a comparatively higher standard of illegality for each of its three
requirements than for the two alternative requirements under § 3 of the Clayton
Act. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., supra note 5; Pillsbury Mills,
Inc., supra note 28; Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep., 129, 130 (1955). The
extent of this comparison cannot be precisely measured. The gap, however, appears
to be closing. Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 51-61.
45Section 3 also covers exclusive dealing arrangements as well as tie-ins. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 17. An exclusive dealing arrangement is where
the buyer agrees not to purchase like products from other sellers. A tie-in is simi-
lar to an exclusive dealing arrangement since the buyer in a tie-in is generally
1965]
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develop a standard of illegality to be applied in meeting the require-
ment of restraint of commerce in the tied product.4 9
The first section 3 standard of illegality was stated in the land-
mark decision of Standard Oil Co. v. United States,50 wherein the
Court established the "quantitative substantiality" test.51 under this
test, if the proponent 2 shows a sufficient percentage of foreclosure in
the tied product, economic harm has been established.5 3 Under a strict
application of this test, the quantity or percentage of the foreclosure
is decisive and the Court makes no further inquiry.
Legal writers criticized this mechanical "quantitative" approach
to section 3 proceedings 54 and, thereafter, its rigidity was relaxed. 55
precluded, as a practical matter, from buying tied products from anyone except
the seller imposing the tying restriction. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, supra note 19, at 6o6 n.23. A "requirements" contract is technically an
exclusive dealing arrangement. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra. An exclusive distributorship,
on the other hand, is not an exclusive dealing arrangement. White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
IThe fact that § 3 covers exclusive dealing arrangements as well as tie-ins
only adds to the confusion of § 3 standards of illegality. Supreme Court dicta de-
clares that since a requirements contract is often entered into for good business
reasons at the behest of the buyer, it will take a "significantly greater" showing to
condemn it than if a tie-in is involved. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra
note s, at 329-32. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 17, at 305-06
the Court made the oft-quoted statement: "Tying arrangements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition."
It is at least clear that the proof required to condemn an exclusive dealing ar-
rangement under § 3 is not less than that required to condemn a tie-in.
r°Supra note 17. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prevented an oil company from
entering into contracts with independent dealers in which the dealers were required
to purchase exclusively from the oil company all of the dealers requirements in
one or more of the products marketed by the oil company. The contracts affected
gross business of $58,oooooo in a seven-state area and comprised 6.7% of the
total amount of oil products sold in that area.
mAt least two writers feel it is inappropriate to cite this case for the "quanti-
tative substantiality" test. Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 30-37.
r4The Justice Department can bring an action for damages or injunction. 38
Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958); 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15 A (1958).
A private suit can be brought in the courts for damages or an injunction. 38 Stat.
731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958); 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). The
Federal Trade Commission also has jurisdiction. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21
(1958).
inTo state it another way: "[W]hen competitors [of the seller] are foreclosed
from a substantial enough share of the market [based on percentages], it is not far-
fetched to infer a substantial lessening of competition." Kessler & Stern, supra note
2, at 28.
rAHandler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 182,
183 (1954); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75, 84-87 (1961);
Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 24-37. Other critics are compiled in Bok, The
Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the
Clayton Act, 191 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 n.28.
5mFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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In its most recent section 3 case, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co.,0r, the Supreme Court seems to present a newer and even more
flexible approach to section 3. Although less than one per cent of the
market was foreclosed,5 7 the Court apparently upheld the arrangement
not only on that basis, but also thoroughly investigated other market
and industry conditions to see if the arrangement had an adverse
competitive effect. This market examination evidences a "qualitative"
approach to section 3 proceedings.5 s
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Clayton Act59 is
not concerned with contractual arrangements but is designed to stop
horizontal0 0 and vertical mergers and acquisitions "if there is a reason-
able probability that the merger will substantially lessen competi-
tion."'61 In Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, however, the statute is significant
because the Commission held that the standard of illegality under sec-
tion 7, particularly as enunciated in the vertical aspect of the Merger
Case, is applicable to section 3 contractual arrangements.
,"Supra note 48. A coal supplier could not avoid a requirements contract under
which he was to fill all the coal needs of a public utility for twenty years.
17The contract covered only 0.77% of all the coal readily available to Florida
purchasers from all suppliers. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., supra note
48, at 333. It has also been pointed out that in the Tampa Electric case, § 3 was set
up merely as a defense to a contract suit, brought by a public utilities company.
15 Vand. L. Rev. 617 (1962).
ruLessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note 46; Bok, supra note 54, at 273-85;
Jones, The New Thrust of the Antimerger Act: The Brown Shoe Decision, 38
Notre Dame Law. 229 (1963); The Supreme Court, 196o Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
40, 205 (1961); 30 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (1962); 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 504 (1962).
'Supra note 20.
c-A horizontal merger or acquisition is one involving two competitors. The
original § 7 proscribed only horizontal stock acquisitions. 38 Stat. 731 (1914); FTC
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
GlBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note i, at 325. The courts and the
Commission have jurisdiction in § 7 proceedings. 38 Stat. 731 (1914); as amended,
64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). Proceedings can begin after the proscribed ac-
tivities have taken place. In United States v. DuPont & Co., supra note 5, the suit
was commenced thirty-two years after the stock acquisition. The Commission
early adopted a "qualitative" standard of proof in its § 7 proceedings. Pillsbury
Mills, Inc., supra note 28; 37 Tul. L. Rev. 1O9 (1962).
The Federal Trade Commission § 7 case of Brillo Mfg. Co., CGH Trade Reg.
Rep. 27,243 (1958), is a good general illustration of the overlap between the
various tests. The Hearing Examiner first applied a "quantitative" test and found
a violation. The Commission reversed and remanded to the Examiner to apply a
"qualitative" test. The Examiner, on remand, did apply a "qualitative" test and
dismissed the complaint. This dismissal was appealed and overruled by the Com-
mission because when the Examiner applied the "qualitative" test on remand, he
paid insufficient attention to the percentages of the market foreclosed. Supra
28,667.
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In the Merger Case, 62 the vertical aspect of the merger potential-
ly foreclosed other manufacturers from only a little over one per cent
of the total retail dealer purchases, and they were actually foreclosed
from only o.12 per cent.63 The Court, however, held that the percent-
age was not de minimus 6 4 and thoroughly examined the shoe industry.
This exhaustive inquiry uncovered an industry-wide movement to-
ward concentration, oligopoly, and vertical integration mainly through
merger. 65 On the basis of these findings, the merger was condemned. 0
OEarlier in United States v. DuPont 9. Co., supra note 5, DuPont had acquired
a 23% stock interest in General Motors and thereafter filled half the General
Motor's requirements for auto fabrics and finishes. The acquisition was con-
demned, although it was not clear whether the Court adopted a "quantitative" or
"qualitative" aproach to § 7. Handler, Annual Review of Recent Antitrust De-
velopments, 12 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 425 (1957).
63After the merger, Brown supplied 7.9% of all Kinney's requirements, and
Kinney sold 1.6% of the total national pairage of nonrubber shoes. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, supra note j, at 3oo, 3o3. This equals o.12% actual fore-
closure. Wiley, Mergers, Section 7 and Brown Shoe, 43 B.U.L. Rev. 367, 374 & n.19
(1963).
"Too insignificant as a matter of law. Even here a "quantitative" floor is put
on these percentages.
63Despite the de minimus floor used by the Court, its overall approach ap-
pears to be "qualitative." Jones, supra note 58; lo U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 637 (1963).
The Court itself stated: "Statistics reflecting the shares of the market .. are, of
course, the primary index of market power; but only a further examination of the
particular market-its structure, history, and probable future-can provide the ap-
propriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note i, at 322 n.38.
6The recent § 7 cases of United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964), and the United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), stress
percentages above all in condemning the mergers. This stress on percentages casts
some doubt on the apparent "qualitative" approach in § 7 proceedings as espoused
in the Merger Case. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 Mich. L.
Rev. 59, 67-78 (1964). Both involved horizontal mergers resulting in approximately
20-30% control of the relevant market after their respective mergers. In one case,
this was an increase of 3.1%. United States v. Continental Can Co., supra at
461. In the other case, the increase was about 1o-15% United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, supra, at 331.
The potential foreclosure percentages in these cases, however, are relatively
high, and the lower courts were reversed. The Court states that in view of such
high percentages, the simplest approach is to condemn the mergers without market
analysis. United States v. Continental Can Co., supra, at 461; United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra at 364. In dicta, the Court states that a low per-
centage would result in a market analysis to see if the merger or acquisition has an
anti-competitive effect. United States v. Continental Can Co., supra at 458; see
United States v. Philidelphia Nat'l Bank, supra at 364 n.41.
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to be saying that if the percentage of potential
foreclosure in a § 7 case is relatively high, a "quantitative" test will be used to
condemn the merger; whereas, if the percentage is low, it can still be condemned if
a thorough market analysis shows the merger has an anti-competitive effect. Thus,
it would seem that when market percentages are low in § 7 proceedings, the courts
CASE COMMENTS
Although Tampa Electric and the Merger Case seem to adopt a
"qualitative" approach to vertical integrations, the rationale of the
Merger Case was preferred by the Commission in Brown Shoe Co. v.
FTC, because the Merger Case more clearly adopted the "qualitative"
test, the quantitative percentage of actual foreclosure was lower, and
an antitrust violation was established.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overruled the Commis-
sion's adoption of the Merger Case and section 7 standards of illegal-
ity by distinguishing vertical mergers from vertical contractual ar-
rangements. The Federal Trade Commission, however, may adopt the
same line of attack in federal courts outside the Eighth Circuit.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This act 6 t was
primarily designed to permit the Federal Trade Commission 6s to en-
join "in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown,
would violate"69 the Sherman and Clayton Act. Section 5 also allows
the Commission to proceed against tying and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements which technically cannot be attacked under the Sherman
or Clayton Acts.70 Although the Commission claims71 that it can en-
join these arrangements with a lower standard of proof than applied
will still apply a "qualitative" test to allow a chance for condemning the merger
as in the Merger Case.
6Supra note ig.
cuApparently only the Federal Trade Commission can proceed under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Clearly § 5 is definitely not available as a basis
for private suits. Moore v. New York Cotten Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926); Samson
Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd
per curiam, i8o F.2d 896 (ist Cir. 1950); Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 64 n.282.
The Justice Department probably does not have jurisdiction under § 5. See Mar-
quette Cement Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 147 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7 th Cir. 1945), aff'd sub nom.
FTC v. Cement Institute, 33 U.S. 683, 701 (1948); Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 64
n.281. The Justice Department has not undertaken to proceed under § 5.
irFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., supra note 55, at 394-95. Cf.
Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466 (1941). Apart from stand-
ards of illegality, one function of § 5, in addition to protecting competition in
general, is to protect individual competitors of the seller-defendant. Thus, § 5
proceedings are not unlike a tort action. Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 22, 45-5o ,
98-ioo. This may also be true of the Clayton Act. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., supra note
28.
7Section 5 is not restricted to "commodities" or a "sale" or a "lease." See note
19; Turner, supra note 3, at 58 & n.33; Att'y Gen., supra note 47, at 148 n.78.
nBrown Shoe Co., supra note 1, at 21,144-45; Luria Bros. Co., Docket No.
6156, CCH 1961-1963 Transfer Binder Trade Reg. 'Rep. 16,183, p. 20,986 (FTC
1962) (proposed order). Both cases cite FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv.
Co., supra note 55.
There appears to be a division of authority among the writers. Compare Hand-
ler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 182 (1954) with
Att'y Gen., supra note 47, at 148 & n.78.
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by the courts under section 3 of the Clayton Act, it has not attempted
to do SO.
72
The "incipiency" purpose of section 5 and the availability of ex-
pert personnel in the Commission contributed to its early adoption
of a "qualitative" approach to exclusive dealing and tying arrange-
ments. 73 When the Commission adopted the "qualitative" test, the
federal courts were still using essentially the "quantitative" approach
in section 3 proceedings. The Commission later found the application
of the "qualitative" test to be difficult, 74 and rejected it in 196o re-
turning to the old "quantitative" approach.75 Both the courts and the
Commission, therefore, would have been using the same test, except
that at about the same time that the Commission was rejecting the
"qualitative" test, the Supreme Court in Tampa Electric was apparent-
ly making a "qualitative" test binding on the courts in section 3 pro-
ceedings. Thus, different standards were apparently again established
in the Commission and the courts.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, the Commission presumably would
have been upheld had the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
sanctioned the Commission's adoption of a "qualitative" approach
to tying arrangements. By distinguishing section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Merger Case, the court held that the Commission was barred
from adopting a "qualitative" approach in tying cases. The reason
for this failure does not rest entirely with the lower federal courts.
Until the Supreme Court further clarifies the tests and when they are
to be applied, the tying arrangement "standards of illegality" will con-
tinue to be shrouded in obscurity.
STANLEY A. WALTON, JR.
AExhaustive case lists are found in Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 64 & n.281;
15 Vand. L. Rev. 617, 620 n.27 (1962).
Maico Co., 5o F.T.C. 485 (1953).
',The Commission seemed to vacillate between the "quantitative" and "quali-
tative" approaches. E.g., Anchor Serum v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7 th Cir. 1954) ("quan-
titative"); Revlon Prod. Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954) ("qualitative"); Outboard
Marine & Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956) ("quantitative").
-Mytinger v. Casselbury, Inc., x96o-i96i COH, Trade Reg. Rep. 29,091 (1960)
(final order), aff'd 3oi F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962) overruling Maico Co., supra note
73. Ironically, this was a classic case for applying a "qualitative" test. Bok, supra
note 54, at 28o.
Incidentally, the court seemed to interpret Tampa Electric as a "quantitative"
case. Mytinger v. Casselbury, Inc., supra at 539. Compare with note 58 and accom-
panying text.
Apparently, it is within the power of the Federal Trade Commission to switch
tests at will without fear of court reversal. Kessler & Stern, supra note 2, at 51 n.244.
